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Ten Years On From the Warnock Report:
Is the Human Embryo a Person?
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The Rev. Dr. Antonio Puca
The author is affiliated with the University of Naples. This paper originally
appeared in Medicina e Morale.
The Impact of the Warnock Report in Latin Countries:
It did not take long before the Warnock Report had repercussions in the Latin
countries. The first positions on this matter were those adopted by the essays
published in the volume edited by the International Federation of Catholic
Universities (FIUC), entitled Unfolding the Origin ofHuman Life. Among these
were the contributions of Carlos Alonso Bedate and Jean-Francois Malherbe,
both of which will be examined here. The contribution by Francise Abel, one of
the editors of the volume, who adopts the position of middle-man between the
different points of view, will also be considered.
Alonso Bedate begins his argument by stressing the necessity of an
interdisciplinary dialogue between science, sociology, theology and morals,
especially in contexts where the terms of "actions or laws of nature" are open to
different interpretations. It is necesary, according to the aforementioned author,
both to listen to the voice of science and at the same time not to ignore the
significance of the present situation in which biology has been converted into
sociology and politics. There are biologists who regard all ethical discussion
regarding genetic or physiological manipulation as irrelevant, while others are
preoccupied with the irreversible problems this technology can generate. The
most difficult problem in establishing an interdisciplinary dialogue does not
therefore derive from the mutual incomprehensibility of the languages employed
but from a conflict of interests.
Bedate identifies two especially important problems presently deriving from
the application of molecular biology to man: gene-therapy involving the human
embryo and in vitro fertilization . As he emphasizes, the basic problems in regard
to these issues concern the ethical value of the zygote and the early embryo. And
as the author points out, the fact of the matter is that those debating these issues
tend to adopt different anthropological standpoints. Some claim that the zygote is
a human being and a person from the moment of conception, others deny that
this is so. According to Bedate, none of the supporters of either view have so far
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offered conclusive proofs for the truth of their statements (Bedate 1989, 62-63).
And as Alonso Bedate sees it, it is impossible to provide biological arguments
deciding this matter. That is to say, "it is impossible to determine whether a
biological entity is a person, unless a priori one has already defined personhood in
biological terms". Though, under no circumstances can one ignore the fact that
- irrespective of the definition of personhood - the zygote is a biological entity
directing its own development in accordance with a human gene programme
(ibid. 63).
As concerns Bedate's view of the genetic programme of the zygote, it has been
summarized in another piece written in collaboration with Roberto C. Cefalo ,
published in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. In this article the two
authors argued that it is not possible to say that the biological characteristics of a
future adult are determined at the time of conception, for the zygote may
subsequently develop into a hydatiform mole instead of turning into a human
being. Whether it develops into an individual human person is determined by a
molecular genetic code provided, not solely by the embryo, but also by the
maternal environment. Consequently, it is an error to think that the
chromosomal DNA (or other) of the zygote alone is sufficient to determine the
future of the individual; it would certainly not be correct to say that the zygote
genome itself possesses the molecular information determining the future person
(Bedate and Cefalo 1989,232).
Francese Abel, for his part, whilst reminding us of the danger mentioned in
Donum Vitae that science and technology may transgress the limit of our rightful
dominion over nature, comments that: "the geneticists who have influenced the
text of Donum Vitae believe that from the moment of syngam y 'the programme is
fixed as to what this living being will be: a man, this individual-man with his
characteristic aspects already well determined'. However, so he argues, this
understanding seems a bit exaggerated" (Abel 1989, 350).
As regards the phrase "fetus-placenta-unit", coined by Angelo Serra, he makes
the observation that: "there it is undoubtedly assumed that this 'fetus-placentaunit' originates from the blastocyst and preceeding it the zygote." But, he says, the
placental structure and the maternal contribution remain completely
marginalized, although without them one cannot explain the development and
differentiation in all the different directions starting with the genetic
programming ofthe embryo (ibid.). According to Abel, "this entity [placenta] in
the uterus is the necessary prerequisite" for the existence of an animated human
body. Genetics he argues, may hold that human life begins at the moment the
ovum has been fertilized but obstetrics suggests the blastocyst stage, when
implantation ofthe particular zygote takes place, as the beginning; before that the
zygote is only a human genetic programme with a merely theoretical and
statistical potential to develop into a member of the human family, as witness the
fact that implantation is achieved in the case of one out of three zygotes only.
Indeed, he continues, observations of the human zygote in vitro provide further
support for this last statement. The development of these zygotes is not
intrinsically directed towards the final end of implantation in the uterus.
From the point of view of obstetrics, according to Abel, the importance of the
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maternal input as an essential constitutive factor of the embryo is confirmed by the
following considerations: suppose that gestation takes place in a surrogate mother
and that the blastocyst derives from a donated ovum fertilized by donated sperm
provided by two anonymous donors. In this case, the surrogate mother provides
virtually everything. The new being is totally dependent on her, even if its genetic
programme, the result of the "chance union" of certain chromosomes, directs its
development and decides the nature and identity of the embryo (ibid. 351). Faced
with the choice between the "orthodox interpretation of the ontological origin of the
embryo" (see Serra) and the "revisionist" one (see Bedato and Cefalo), as he calls
them, Abel is clearly in favour of the latter, this "being in keeping with the intuitions
and the understanding of obstetrics" (ibid. 352). However, taking up the same
argument in a more systematic work on the technologies of assisted conception,
Abel, who objects to the use of these technologies, concedes that the "pre-embryo"
possesses the value of a "potential human being", whilst confirming that one cannot
speak of a human person until the stage of implantation (Abel 1992, 41).
Finally, lean-Francois Malherbe, in his essay on the status ofthe human embryo,
points to three dimensions of human existence relevant to the understanding of the
personal status of the human embryo: the symbolica£ the mental and the organic
(Malherbe 1989, 86). "If the organic life of the human being begins at fertilisation,
his or her life of relationship begins at implantation. From the time the zygote turns
into an embryo, and from whence it becomes an individual and enters into
communion with its mother, its life begins developing in the mental dimension.
From that time on it is possible to speak of the embryo as a potential human
person." However, this potential human person, Malherbe explains, is not an actual
human person until its existence starts developing within the symbolical dimension,
"It is not until the potential human person enters into the sphere of symbolic
communication that he is really actua\ised" (ibid. 88-89).
Respect for Zygote
On what, then, according to Malherbe, is the respect for zygote or the embryo to
be founded? His answer is: On an "existential solidarity': He explains that this
"existential solidarity of human beings, which we cannot deny without denying
what we are, calls for the humility to welcome the other without wanting to control
him; it allows him life and freedom to cultivate his own autonomy. But, he says, "it
is not possible for us to realise this radical human solidarity in life, unless we actually
recognize our solidarity, our finituide and our doubts" (ibid. 90).
The three contributors mentioned have much in common, while each one also
makes his own specific points. If Alonso Bedate puts heavy emphasis on the genetic
data, Abel advocates the importance of the maternal input as an essential and
constitutive part of the embryo. According to Bedate, they "are arguing from
different anthropological points of view" (Bedate 1989, 62).
In my view, while it is right to take into consideration the maternal influence on
the embryo's development, it would seem, however, that it is not an "essential and
constitutive factor" to the point of deciding its identity.
As regards the statement in Donum Vitae that "from the time that the ovum is
fertilised, a new life is begun which is neither that of the father or of the mother; it is
rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. it would never be
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made a human being if it were not human already" (Donum Vitae I, I), Abel
regrets, as he put it, the preference of the document of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith for "the orthodox interpretation of the ontological origin of
human life". It corresponds, he says, to an anthropological vision which marries
the data of science with those of philosophy.
But as I see it, given the scientific data, it seems plausible that personal life
begins at the moment of conception or syngamy. According to philosophical
reflection, it is these data which are the basis for the ethical judgement that the
human embryo must be respected as a person. This also provides a defence of
human life before the dangers of genetic and physiological manipulation,
denounced by Bedate.
As to Malherbe's argument allowing for not only an organic dimension but
also for a mental and a symbolic one, he maintains that, in line with modern
anthropology, the modern literature on psychology of how the I and the you
enter into a mutual subjective relationship shows that this kind of relationship is
founded not simply on relational facts but also on existential ones. That is to say,
our "existential solidarity", he thinks, is to be explained by the fact that those
human beings who cultivate it open themselves to others.
Other arguments meriting attention are those of Maurizio Mori (1988) and
Manuel Cuyas (1989). In a philosophical analysis of the arguments adopted by
Catholic medical ethicists about the beginning and end of life, Mori suggests a
parallel between abortion and transplantation. "Just as transplantation violates
the donor's right to life if performed before his death, abortion violates the right to
life of the fetus if performed after the fetus has become a person; just as
transplantation performed after death does not violate the right to life but may be
wrong because it violates other 'social obligations', abortion before the fetus has
become a person does not violate the right to life but may be wrong because it
violates other 'social obligations'" (Mori 1988, 100).
According to Mori, even the reflections of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith (CD F), in its Declaration on Procured Abortion (1974), "show by
means of an 'anti-probablist argument' that it is wrong to interfere with the
development of the fetus, though not because it violates any 'ontological duty'
deriving from the fetus's right to life" (Mori 1988, 119). The argument, he says, is
based on two fundamental premises: first, it is not the task of science to establish
the moment at which the human (or spiritual) soul is infused; this is a
philosophical, not a scientific, question (Donum Vitae I, I); secondly, since we do
not know exactly at what moment the soul is infused (philosophy is not in a
position to give us a firm answer), and since one should follow the safest path
when in doubt, abortion is (absolutely) wrong; for one must never take the risk of
killing a person (Mori 1988:120).
Having recourse to the definition of brain death stipulated by the Working
Party of the Pontifical Academy of Science for the Extraction of Organs for
Transplantation (1985, 5), according to which "a person is dead if he has,
irreversibly, lost the capacity for integrated and coordinated physical and mental
bodily functions", Mori affirms, as regards abortion, that "it must be recognised
that there is no 'personal life' before the fetus has acquired the capacity to
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integrate and coordinate the physical and mental functions of the body" (Mori
1988, 127). Thus, in his view, the starting point for an exact definition of the
problem, whether in the case of nascent life or in that of transplants, should be not
the beginning but the end of life. The solution to theoretical confusions and
subsequent conflicts are not to be found in any "medical definition" but in a
"philosophical definition" (ibid. 128).
Mori's argument, then, is based on a parallel between the beginning and the end
oflife, a thesis defended by a number of writers favoring the "brain life theory" (cf.,
Golderning 1985). The present author has written elsewhere on the weakness of this
theory, both from a biological and a philosophical point of view (Puca 1993:
88-94). In brief, it can be said that with "brain death" comes the total disappearance
of any "unifying principle", whether of relations with the external world or those
between internal organs and tissues; this is the progressive disintegration of the
individual. By contrast, as others have argued, "embryonic development
demonstrates a close relationship between cells, tissues and organs, eventually
actualising the possibility to enter into a relationship with the external world also"
(Serra 1989, 101-104; Cuyas 1989, 443).
It is noteworthy, however, that even if Mori's view about the role of philosophy
in regard to the definition of birth and death is accepted, the separation between
science and philosophy cannot be sustained. Referring to note 19 of The
Declaration on Procured Abortion of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
(1974), which states that it is not up to biological sciences to make a definitive
judgement on questions which are properly philosophical and moral, such as the
moment when a human soul is constituted, Mori argues that "to say that this [the
question of animation] is a question of philosophy is to make it clear that the whole
debate is one based on arguments ofreason" (Mori 1988, 143, note 30). But in
response to this, it should be said that just as rational reflection cannot ignore
scientific fact, science requires philosophical reflection. And, I would add, the issues
concerning the embryo, while adequately addressed by science, nevertheless
transcend science.
In Donum Vitae, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith emphasizes the
fact that: "from the time the ovum is fertilised, a new life is begun . .. the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say, from the
moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally
due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality (Donum Vitae 1.1).
Commenting on this statement, Mory says, that it is not open to the objection that it asserts that it is wrong to interfere with the development of the fetus, because this
involves a violation of the "ontological duty" deriving from the fetus's "right to life".
The "ontological duty", to use the original expression of The Declaration on
Procured Abortion (1974), is based, as is pointed out by Morac:z.evski, not on rights and
duties conferred by the law, but on the concept of the "ontological subject" which
underlies both the legal and the psychological subject (Morac:z.evski 1983,301).
It should be pointed out, however, that the 1974 document confirms the position
of those - who like the present author - emphasize the holistic unity of the human
being from the moment of conception.
Avoiding any form of Cartesian dualism (Eccles Popper 1977, 9), and also the
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position that there is no such entity as a person, but only a continuous series of
interconnected conscious states in temporal succession (Locke; Hume; Rorty
1976), the human person may, as Ashley and O'Rourke have argued, be defined as
an "embodied intelligent freedom" (Ashley and O'Rourke 1989). According to this
definition, a person is a bodily being by nature capable of rational thought and of
choosing between different alternatives without being subject to internal coercion.
But, as Moraczevski has pointed out, this kind of capacity is a "radical capacity";
having it does not necessarily mean this power is exercizable here and now or that it
is already developed - witness the case of a sleeping person or that of a child. On
the present understanding, a human person is a biological entity - a material entity
- and at the same time an entity which transcends biology (Moraczevski 1983,
302).
This takes us to a second point, suggested by the Spanish author Manual Cuyas,
who argues that it is not yet possible to specify an "anthropological concept" which
brings together the holistic unity of the corporality and the transcendence of the
. person, i.e. brings together both his biological and cultural aspects (Cuyas 1989,
448). No solution proposed so far for determining the status of the embryo satisfies
either the genome or the mental criterion, affirming personhood solely on the basis
of relationships with others. Nor, he says, does the cultural criterion, focusing on
specific qualities of the person or a ')uridicial" criterion, guaranteeing the status of
the embryo by arbitrarily delimiting its protection; nor even does a "nondiscriminating" one, ignoring the specific differences between living things without
souls (plants), with sensitive souls (animals) and with rational souls (human beings).
According to Cuyas, all the criteria mentioned above suffer from the
shortcoming of trying to identify the status of the embryo in terms of the moment at
which the human person begins to exist. The problem is therefore badly defined;
life, he says, eludes the competences of the empirical sciences (biology and
psychology), because their methodology obliges them to place entities in a spaciotemporal context, in which there is no room for the concepts of "subject",
"individual" and "person". It may be possible to have an understanding of these
concepts within philosophy or theology, but the sciences of the psyche cannot
establish when the "subject", the "individual" or the "person" begins to exist (Cuyas
1989,450).
We are here faced with the problem, noted by Mori, posed by a total separation
of the facts of science and philosophical reflection. That is to say, it is not possible to
accept Cuyas's position that· "only a moral approach can provide a coherent
account of the status of the human embryo" (ibid.). Both scientific data and moral
reflection entail moral evaluation; such a valuation can be separated neither from
the objective data of science nor from the anthropology considering all aspects of
the human being. Indeed, if one of these elements were lacking, it would be
impossible to find a correct moral solution to the problem.
And it would appear that both scientific data and philosophical reflection point
to the fact that life begins at the moment of fertilization. Thus, as Serra says, "a
welcome return to respect for the human subject from his beginning at syngamy,
because each one of us began life at that point (were it not for the zygote none of us
would be here)," (Serra 1993, 115).
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Such an understanding is also in line with the statement in Donum Vitae: "the
Magisterium has not expressly committed itself to an affirmation of a
philosophical nature, but it constantly reaffirms the moral condemnation of any
kind of procured abortion" ... Thus, "the fruit of human generation, from the first
moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed,
demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his
bodily and spiritual totality" .. . "The human being is to be respected and treated
as a person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same
moment his rights as a person must b~ recognised, among which in the first place
is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life" (Donum Vitae, 1.1).
This document ofthe Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is principally of
a moral nature. While it leaves room for further philosophical reflection, it firmly
demands the respect due to the human being from the moment of its conception.
The position adopted in this document may well be the most appropriate in the
face of the facts of science and, as Serra says, one that may overcome the
difficulties stemming, on the one hand, from the confidence scientists and doctors
- and theologians - have in themselves and in their own opinions, and on the
other, from irresistable cultural pressures (Serra 1993: 113).
By contrast, the Warnock Report and the positions examined above seem
obvious cases of surrender to the aforementioned pressures. However, the
contribution by Cuyas may be deemed valuable on account of its anthropological
reflections on the embryo and personhood in terms of the attributes of corporeity
and transcendence. "Corporeity (the objectivity of the being in itself) and
transcendence (relational openness) must be the two focal points, when seeking a
solution to the problem posed by the necessity of recognising the presence of a
personal being" (Cuyas 1989, 441).
What is required is a more profound understanding of the very nature of the
human person. And, by way of comment, it would seem that the Boethian
definition of a person as "natural is naturae individua substantia" - like those
contemporary ones referring to the "I-you" relationship, or the realm of
interpersonal relationships - while capable of establishing a universal concept of
a spiritual personal subject does not manage to capture what constitutes the
essence of man . Only in theology, as Scola argues, is it possible to do so; here
personhood relates to the mission of man; here, consequently, the question of
"who I am" finds a complete answer (Scola 1985, 235).

Theological Reflections
To the question wherein lies the essence of man, of the adult and well as the
embryo, the immediate answer is: in the Lord. The Lord; that is to say, the
Mystery comprising everything in its totality at every moment. The narrative in
Genesis (Gn I, 26) confronts us, without introduction, with our divine destiny;
this being a characteristic of our nature. Indeed, this understanding is expressed in
numerous passages in the Scripture.
Catholic theology, which has compressed centuries of reflection on man into
three statements, maintains first, that man is composed of body and soul (DS 902,
1440,3002; Gaudium et Spes, 14-15) and secondly, that the soul is the form of the
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human body (DS 902). Thirdly, it relates the spiritual nature of man (DS 800,
2812) to the immortality of the soul (DS 1140, 2765). But it is above all the
theme of man created in the image of God, found both in the New and Old
Testaments, and repeated by the Church Fathers, which theological tradition has
dwelt on.
Answering the question "What is man?", Thomas Aquinas, inspired by St.
Augustine replies: he is an imperfect image of God. According to Scola, "he
explains that Jesus Christ alone is the true image .. . because he is of the same
nature as the Father. Strictly speaking, man is not the image of God, but only
approximating to the image of God - meaning that man has a tendency towards
the full realisation of his being made in the image of God, which opens up the
possibility of laying the foundations of morality . .. " Furthermore, he says,
"being made in the image of God, we are by implication 'theological persons',
human beings defined through Christ's mission in this world", which, so he
argues," explains the urgent appeal of theology to philosophy to found in the
sphere of theology the concept of the person and those connected with it, such as
those of dignity and human rights. (Scola 1985, 222-223).
On this understanding, what is made in the image of God is man, not a
subspecies of Homo Sapiens or a species created as a result of a moral decision on
the part of ethicists (Kuhse and Singer 1984, 60). As Camerons puts it, "the
foundation of the dignity of man does not consist in his being Homo sapiens, nor
in his being of my own species; rather it is because of his special form of being
(man and not gorilla, man and not tadpole, man and not tree) reflecting and
deriving from God in a way that no other form is or could be, that every man
must be respected by me and by every other creature" (Cameron 1985,9).
Another point of note, concerns the authority of God and the stewardship of
man. Christian theologians have since ancient times availed of the language of
Greek philosophy to translate this Biblical metaphor. The concepts of nature,
creation and grace are the three important ones expressing the power of God and
the stewardship of man. From a theological point of view, dominion or
stewardship are different ways in which man can participate in the creative work
of God - or destroy it(cf. Gn2, 15;Gn2, 19-20; Gn4, ; 1 S8, 1-22; 1 K 1, 12;
Ezk. 31, 2-3; h 2, 7: Mt 20,25-28; Mt 25, 14-30; Mt. 25, 31-46), which raises the
question whether man is the master or the steward of creation and, in particular,
whether man may intervene without any restrictions and change the things and
creatures entrusted to him.
According to Ashley, the Biblical principles for an "ethics of technology" may
be summarized as follows: In making us intelligent and free, God has made us
participants in his mastery over the world and over our own lives, but this power
shared with God is a stewardship which must be exercised in cooperation with
God in the completion of His creation. Hence, human technology is not a sphere
of absolute dominion, but of relative dominion under the guidance of the loving
wisdom of God, with the strength and care which comes by means of God's
grace" (Ashley 1992, 87).
Gaudium et Spes (1965), has also offered an explanation of the concepts of
dominion and stewardship: "Man ... created in the image of God, has been given
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the task of subduing the earth with all it contains, and of governing the world in
justice and holiness ... recognising in God the creator of all things, in such a way that
in the subordination of all things to man, the name of God be glorified throughout
the earth" (Gaudium el Spes, n.340).
The biblical and conciliar teaching can be expressed in one single principle:
"Human beings are morally obliged to use and to modify their natural environment
and their own bodies in accordance with their intrinsic teleology" (Ashley 1992,
92). This principle, formulated by Ashley, is applicable both to the ecosystem and to
other problems in bioethics, such as the experimental use of embryos.
Finally, an observation is in place about the significance of the Incarnation. It
is no accident that Cardinal Henry Newman, reacting against the liberalrationalist interpretation of the Anglican Church, placed the Incarnation at the
center of his theological thought. Obviously, we are in no position to deduce from
the event of the Incarnation arguments deciding when exactly the body becomes
ensouled. But it is impossible to deny that God became flesh , made of DNA, of
protein - an embryo. And this is not only the view of Newman, the whole life of
the Church hangs on this Creed, the life of Jesus on earth began, not in
Bethlehem, but in Nazareth, with the annunciation of the Angel Gabriel to the
Virgin Mary. This testifies to the fact, while the life of the Son of God was
different from that of man insofar as it is the work of the Holy Spirit, if was,
nevertheless, human inasmuch as it was conceived in the body of a woman. It
began at conception.
Vatican II described the duality of Christ's nature as follows : "With the
Incarnation, the Son of God became in a certain sense related to every man. He
worked with the hands of a man, thought with the mind of a man, acted with the
will of a man and loved with the heart of a man. Born of the Virgin Mary, He
became in truth one of us, like us in all things but sin" (Gaudium el Spes, n 22)
That is to say, the Incarnation totally took the form of the human physiognomy.
" In the mystery of the World Incarnate the mystery of man becomes clear"
(Gaudium el Spes n.22).
As Adam briefly sums up Christianity: "The Christian message is not, then,
simply about the ascent of created beings to the height of the divinity, it is not
simpl y about glorification, about divinisation of human nature, but above all
about the descent of the divinity, of the Word lowering Himself so far as to
assume the humble form of a truly human being. This is the central point of the
ancient Christian message: "The Word was made flesh, He lived among us"
(John 1, 14). "He did not cling to His equality with God, but emptied Himself to
assume the condition of a slave, and became as men are" (Ph 2,7) (Adam 1983:
13-14).
This essential message of Christianity has three aspects: the message is of an
escatological nature, it is oriented towards the end of time, it is of a sacramental
nature and it is of a social nature (Ibid. 22-24). Seeing the subject matter of this
essa y in this light, the teleological character of the zygote is best defined in terms
of its orientation and tendency towards its fulfillment in Christ (Ep 1,23).
But as Karl Adam asks: "Is it still right, still required of us, who live at the
present time, in today's European culture, to say 'yes' to the Christ's message?"
May, 1995
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This is like Dostoevsky's question whether in fact a civilised man, a European can
still have faith. "The metaphysical faculties ofthe modern man have atrophied",
Adam says. "Plato would say that he lacks an eye for the invisible. The sense for
perceiving the divine and supernatural is failing. And for this reason, modern
man feels a secret aversion to all things which steal into this world of phenomena
as a complete novelty claiming to be absolute and immediately from God.
According to the mentality of antiquity, miracles and visible signs were, so to
speak, the natural way for God to show Himself, the visible proofs of his
presence; according to the modern mentality, on the other hand, they are a
scandal" (Adam 1983, 26-27). Abolished, therefore, is the Son of God and
suppressed the belief that man is made in the image of God, for whom the Son of
God was born, lived and died.
Christianity, on the other hand, expresses a profound awe before the dignity of
man. The man who seeks a deeper understanding of himself must, so to speak,
allow Christ to enter into him and fill his whole self; he must "appropriate" and
assimilate the whole reality of the Incarnation and the Redemption in order to
find himself. If this profound process takes place within him, it will bear fruit
resulting not onl y in the adoration of God, but also in a deeper wonder at himself.

Conclusion
This experience of awe and wonder enables us to solve the various ethical
problems arising in relation to the embryo. Thus, to quote from the document of
the Congregation ofthe Faith: "To use human embryos or fetuses as the object or
instrument of experimentation constitutes a crime against their dignity as human
beings having a right to the same respect that is due to the child already born and
to every human person" (Donum Vitae I, 4). Again, in regard to therapeutic
interventions, the document calls not only for respect for the life and integrity of
the embryo but also for the free and informed consent of its parents. And in
regard to experimental intervention on dead embryos, it calls for respect for the
embryo itself in order to avoid in any way encouraging abortion and any form of
commercialization (Donum Vitae I, 4). In addition, Donum Vitae gives a clear
and unequivocal answer to many other questions related to experimentation on
the embryo such as those concerning prenatal diagnosis (Donum Vitae 1,2), the
use and destruction of surplus embryos (Donum Vitae 1,5), the use of frozen
embryos (Donum Vitae 1,6), heterologous artificial insemination (Donum Vitae
II, 1-2), homologous artificial insemination (Donum Vitae II, 6), in vitro
fertilisation (Donum Vitae II, 4-5) and surrogate motherhood (Donum Vitae II,
3).
The focus here has been on the question of the status of the embryo. It may be
commented that, in agreement with the position adopted by the Catholic
Bishops' Joint Committee on Bio-ethical Issues (of England, Scotland, Ireland
and Wales) in its response to the Warnock Report, the Italian Senate has called
for urgent legislation to prohibit "any form of experimentation on the human
embryo which risks damaging it or endangering its life by delaying its transfer and
implantation. It also advocates the prohibition of any form of freezing or storing
undertaken without a genuine and definite prospect of subsequent transfer of the
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unimpaired embryo to its real mother, as well as the prohibition of any form of
selection among living and developing human embryos in order to transfer and
implant only the fittest and most desirable ones (Senato dell Repubblica 1991,
243-244).
Finally, it should be said, that terms such as "pre-embryo" and "spare
embryos" are to be rejected. These expressions have been imposed upon us by a
totalitarian ideology at the service of the "new world order" (Schooyans 1993,
48) and do not respect the uniqueness ofthe human being. It does not reflect the
original attitude of man, that which most closely corresponds to how he feels in
his heart of hearts, which is an attitude not of altering, dissecting or counting but
like that of Eve who cried: "I have acquired a man with the help of Yahweh" (Gn
4,1) or like that of Mary who said: "Let what you have said be done to me" (Lk 1,
38). Indeed, even those without a Christian faith are aware that without this
attitude of respect for human individuality, "the only thing that remains is the
"World Council of Administration".
In sum, to quote Ratzinger, that, which according to the teaching of the
Church must be respected in the generation of human life is not a biological or
physiological datum wrongly regarded as sacred but, rather the dignity of the
human person or of the three human persons involved in the process of
generation (Ratzinger 1988: 207-208).
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